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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
pear as candidates in their places. The decision is in accord with the prin-
ciple enunciated in State v. Circuit Court of Marathon County (1922) 178
Wis. 468, 190 N. W. 563. In that case the question in issue was whether
the court could enjoin the county clerks from placing on the official ballot the
name of a regularly nominated candidate for state senator on the ground
that he was ineligible. It was held that the eligibility of a nominee to office
could not be judicially determined until after election, even though non-
eligibility were plainly disclosed. Prior to an election voters have no inter-
est in the eligibility of candidates which entitles them to file any sort of
action. P. S. A., '31.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-AUTHORITY OF WIFE TO PLEDGE CREDIT OF HUS-
BAND.-In a suit by a mercantile establishment against defendant whose
wife was furnished by him with ample means to pay cash for articles of
clothing, it was held that the wife was without right to purchase a fur
coat on her husband's credit and that the husband was entirely absolved
from liability. Saks v. Huddleston et ux. (D. C. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 537.
The decision undoubtedly follows the almost universal holding. MeCreery
and Co. v. Martin (1913) 84 N. J. L. 626, 87 Atl. 433; Wickstrom V. Peck
(1914) 136 App. Div. 608, 148 N. Y. S. 596; Eder v. Grifka (1912) 149
Wis. 606, 136 N. W. 154. The leading case of Wanamaker v. Weaver
(1903) 176 N. Y. 75, 68 N. E. 135, enunciated the theory that marriage and co-
habitation do not constitute a holding out of the wife as an agent to purchase
necessaries. Although a presumption of such agency may exist, it is only
prima facie, and may be rebutted by proof that the husband either fur-
nished the necessaries himself or gave the wife ample allowance. It is true
that some early English cases held a ontra view, chiefly expressed in dicta,
as in Johnson v. Sumner (1858) 3 Hurlst. & N. 261, 157 Eng. R. 469, but
the modern doctrine is in accord with the principal case. Morel Bros. V.
Westm reland (1903) 1 K. B. 64; note (1903) 65 L. R. A. 529, 542.
In the principal case the court, after citing authority, thus justifies its
decision: "Its tendency will be to check extravagance (one of the most
pronounced of modern evils), and at the same time protect husbands, who
in good faith have made such provision for their wives as their means and
station in life warranted, from debts thoughtlessly and needlessly con-
tracted, and often beyond the capacity of the husband to pay." And as to
the merchant, "The present-day means available to merchants for the
ascertainment of the moral and financial responsibility of patrons and
customers are such that little apprehension need be indulged on account of
the rule we have just announced."
In view of the imposing array of authority it is with some hesitation
that one ventures the criticism that the doctrine is not one well adapted to
modern usage. Unfortunately the mercantile practice is not what the
courts wish or think it to be, and apparently it will not be changed. In the
city of St. Louis, as disclosed by the credit department of a large depart-
ment store, it is the practice not to question the wife's authority when she
opens an account in her husband's name. It is found to be embarrassing,
often to the point of losing trade, to ask too many questions. The princi-
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pal case relies on the safeguard of credit information to protect the mer-
chant, but this does not meet the problem. The question is not the financial
responsibility of the husband, but the authority of the wife to pledge such
credit. Further, in most cases the wife has the authority, and it is not
an unreasonable presumption on the part of the merchant that such au-
thority is given in all cases. Since the husband is liable for necessaries,
the merchant assumes that he is safe in selling what would be necessaries
were it not for the allowance. The rule enunciated in the cases is perhaps
indicative of the inability of the courts to keep abreast with economic prac-
tice. R. W. B., '31.
LATERAL SUPPORT-DUTY TO PROTECT ADJOINING BuILINGS.-In Mac-
Millan Co. v. Massell Realty Improvement Co. (Ga. 1929) 147 S. E. 38, the
court held that where a proprietor desires to make an excavation up to the
line of his lot for the purpose of constructing a building, and the adjacent
proprietor has an existing building the wall of which extends along the
property line, it is the duty of the party desiring to make the excavation to
give the adjoining proprietor reasonable notice of his intention and also
to take reasonable precautions to sustain the land of the other, so as to
avoid injury to the land and the building thereon. In accordance with this
ruling the Massell Realty Improvement Co. were enjoined from proceeding
with an excavation until they had taken reasonable precautions to secure
the building of the MacMillan Co.
The holding in this case is directly in conflict with the common law on
this subject, which is still in effect in nearly all jurisdictions. The right to
lateral support has always been considered to apply to land in its natural
state only, and it was considered the duty of the adjoining owner, upon
notice of impending excavations, to shore or prop up his, own building.
The excavator would be liable for damages to the adjoining building only
if he were negligent in excavating. 1 R. C. L. 385; Transportation Co. v.
Chicago (1878) 99 U. S. 635; Home Brewing Co. v. Thomas Colliery Co.
(1922) 274 Pa. 56, 117 Atl. 542; Davis v. Sap (1926) 20 Ohio App. 180, 152
N. E. 758.
The decision in the principal case was based on a statute which previously
had been construed favorably to the owners of buildings by the Georgia
court. "The owner of adjoining land has the right, on giving reasonable
notice of his intention so to do, to make proper and needful excavations
even up to the line for purpose of construction, using ordinary care and
taking reasonable precautions to sustain the land of the other." Ga. Code
of 1926, sec. 3620. This seems merely to state the common law rule and to
overlook completely the possibility of superimposed structures on the land.
The Georgia court in Bass v. West (1900) 110 Ga. 698, 36 S. E. 244, as-
sumes that "land" means "land and building," as it does in the later case of
Wilkins v. Grant (1903) 118 Ga. 522, 45 S. E. 442, holding that the judge's
instruction "that it was duty of the defendant to use ordinary care to sus-
tain 'the land' of the plaintiff" without instructing in the same connection
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